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Abstract
Whether animals, especially companion animals, count as friends depends on the
conception of friendship as well as on the conception of animals. Some accounts of
friendship can include (other than human) animals more easily than others. I
present an argument in favour of characterising some animal-human connections
as friendships, and address some of the standard objections to this
characterisation. It might seem that under any conception of friendship,
characterising animals as (potential) friends would likely lead to better treatment of
animals, as various kinds of ill-treatment or use would not be consistent with
treating someone as a friend. However, concern for animal welfare typically
extends well beyond the direct concern for our own household companions, and is a
concern for animals (or certain animals) in general, whereas friendship, by its
nature, is particularist. There are limits to applying the concept of friendship to
animal treatment beyond particular relationships.

1. Introduction
To some people, it is simply obvious that friendship with an
animal is a full, even supreme, manifestation of everything friendship
needs to be. Looking at actual relationships, it is hard to deny that the
relationship to a non-human companion is the (equal) strongest
connection in the lives of some humans, temporarily or permanently
(for compelling fictional examples, see Auster 1999; Hornung 2010).
But some people would judge the fact that a human’s best friend
really is a dog, cat or horse to be rather sad. They would think that
friendship with an animal is, in some sense or other, weaker than, or
inferior to the (possible) connections humans can cultivate together.
There is no clear consensus about animals as friends.
I focus on companion animals, also known as pets, as these seem
to be the clearest candidates for being called friends. Human-animal
companionship, or pet-human cohabitation, is just one area of
interaction between humans and animals, and it is not isolated from
other areas. For example, a pet might be part of a clinical trial or a
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work of art. On a farm, an animal might spend part of its life as a pet,
then become food or commodity, an assistance dog might retire as a
pet. As Tony Milligan notes, in its rich sense, being a pet means much
more than being a live animal purchased from a pet shop (Milligan
2009). The sense at issue here encompasses those creatures with
whom humans can share some kind of reciprocal relationship. This is
perhaps clearest with dogs and perhaps cats.
Some philosophical attention has been paid to animal-human
friendship, but here, too there is little consensus. Some recent
examples include Silke Shicktanz’ discussion of a range of humananimal relationships including friendship, patronage and partnership
models (Schicktanz 2006); Jeff Jordan’s argument for vegetarianism
based on the unacceptability of eating potential friends (Jordan
2001); Donna Haraway’s extensive work on the overlap or mutual coconstruction of human and non-human lives, including a rich
exploration of shared activities like dog agility work (Haraway 2007).
Milligan has discussed animals and end of life decisions in ways that
illuminate the depth of the connections between humans and
animals, but resists calling these relationships “friendships” (Milligan
2009).
Thinking about animal and human friendships offers some
potential for understanding animals including humans. Even if
human and animal bonds are not friendships, they are interesting as
relationships that involve affection and/or close and sympathetic
attention. These might show up morally important features of the
participants, because of the kind of attentive care involved. We can
learn about our human selves from interaction with animals. In Freya
Mathews’ words:
emotional involvement with creatures who do not share
our human goals and aspirations, our systems of values,
enables us to gain an external perspective on
those
values. It enables us to appreciate how odd or arbitrary
our human priorities might appear to non-human
observers (Mathews 2007, 16).

47

With respect to building understanding of animals,
companionship can stand alongside the kind of close and long-term
observation that ethologists recommend as basic to good
information. Arguably, from the perspective of such relationships we
are less likely to underestimate both the capacities of animals and, a
moral leverage advocate might hope, undermine the associated view
that (some) animals have lives that merit little or no protection (from
killing, suffering, exploitation, disrespect and the like.) Satz, for
example, discusses a non-discrimination approach to animal welfare
(Satz 2006).
However, caution is warranted (Spencer, Decuypere, Aerts & De
Tavernier 2006; Tuan 1984). Pet owners might overestimate or
distort the capacities of their animals (proximity does not guarantee a
clear view, as the history of sexist and racist views demonstrates) and
cruelty to companion animals is widespread. More radically, it has
been argued that pets are not animals in their own right – they are
human artefacts or creations. The cute, decorative, sentimentalised
pets that sometimes show up with celebrities seem to support this
view. However, this objection has two problems. First, it trades on a
problematic view of an authentic animal, uninfluenced by its
environment, human or otherwise. Second, as I will argue, humans
are shaped by animals, too, and this mutual influence is an important
aspect of animal-human friendship.

2. Talking about Animals
The main controversy about how to refer to household animals is
not about calling my dog my “friend,” but about the labels of “pet”
and “owner”. For example, PETA (People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals) have argued against the institution of pet ownership,
pointing out that it often fails to achieve high or even minimally
decent standards of compassion and wellbeing. Some argue that the
term “ownership” should be replaced by “guardianship” which better
connotes the relevant responsibilities (Hankin, 2009). Some
jurisdictions adopt language of animal companion, some vets replace
“pets and owners” with “pets and guardians” or (in the case of my
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local vet) “pets and their people” which interestingly subverts the
notion of ownership. The compatibility of these categories with
friendship is complex, because guardianship and pet-hood are not
relations of equals, and are irreducibly asymmetric. We can be
mutual friends or companions, but not really each other’s pets.
Arguably, ownership and friendship can be compatible, but this does
not make friendship and guardianship an easy fit. Ownership is a
multi-stranded bundle of rights, and the bundle of rights and
responsibilities of guardianship might fit differently with friendship.
Guardianship involves certain responsibilities, so it differs from
typical friendship, which includes influence, but not a right to decide
on behalf of the friend. Interestingly, there have been objections to
the change in certain jurisdictions to “guardianship” language, often
coming from veterinarian groups. This reflects a concern that the
quite specific obligations of legal guardianship (in human cases) will
carry over to the client who brings her animal to the vet – this seems
a misguided concern as that interpretation is explicitly ruled out in
much of the legislation (Satz, 2006).
Another objection to “pet” and preference for “guardian” is that
pet lacks the connotations of welfare for the animal and might be
consistent with “convenience euthanasia” whereas “guardian” carries
the connotation of looking out for the other’s welfare and interests.
But Milligan sees the term differently: “The concept of pet, which
plays a role within a life that is enriched by a relation to a non-human
other, is one which involves treating (valuing) these animals as
unique and irreplaceable creatures” (Milligan 2009, 406). A
replaceable animal isn’t a pet, neither is a disposable animal.
There does seem to be mutuality, both in affection and in
shaping between pets and their people. Perhaps friendship requires
mutuality, but not symmetry, and if so, pet-hood and friendship
might be compatible.
Milligan opts for “guardianship” and “companionship” as the
proper labels for dependent relationships between humans and
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animals. Like friendship, companionship involves some kind of
reciprocity or mutual appreciation:
This reciprocity need not be understood as cognitively
demanding for the animal. An animal guardian may be
well aware that their lifelong companion’s appreciation of
the companionship is of a restricted sort. I will suggest
that this supports the use of a terminology of
companionship rather than friendship and that the latter
involves a more demanding requirement of mutual
understanding (Milligan 2009, 410).
Milligan sees the human-animal relationship as deeply valuable,
his choice to avoid the term “friendship” does not at all indicate a
dismissive or derogatory attitude. Milligan is quite clear that
relationships with companion animals are morally serious, for
example, in ways that preclude thinking of pets as simply replaceable.
Conversely, some who accept the terminology of friendship seem to
have a less robust view of (some dimensions of) their moral
importance. Kristien Hens is comfortable saying that our
relationships with animals (in particular dogs) can be friendships.
However, she goes on to qualify these friendships. “Within a
relationship of friendship, there are again major differences: dogs are
only for a short period of time in our lives, they are to some extent
replaceable and they are at our mercy with regard to medical care and
euthanasia” (Hens 2009, 8). These differences show that there is no
simple uncontroversial way to label the connections between humans
and animals, as the terms can have different connotations.
Irreplaceability and uniqueness are important characteristics for
relationships involving priority or partiality, whether these are
termed friendly or companionate connections. Friendship is one such
relationship, but so are family ties, and guardianships. Pets are, in the
relevant sense, irreplaceable. Friends share non-substitutability with
other relationships – family and other attachments, rivals and even
enemies could be this way. So while showing non-substitutability
does not suffice to show friendship, it appears that relationships with
pets have at least some of the characteristics relevant to friendship.
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3. Objections to Animal-Human Friendship
The question about animal-human friendship is just not about
the label, “friend,” “pet” or “guardian,” but about the intersection
between the kind of relationship that friendship is, and the kinds of
connection that (some) humans have with (some) animals. There are
three main objections to taking animals to be full participants in
friendships with humans: first, the power differential is too great;
second, the cognitive demand of friendship exceeds animal
capacities; and third, animals are not ethical agents in the requisite
sense (perhaps because they lack the relevant cognitive capacities).
Does inequality of power preclude friendship? Human control
over a pet is extensive. It includes when and what the pet eats,
exercises, is located, breeds and so on. (This is related to seeing the
pet as an artefact.) But animals who live in companionship with
humans are not determined by human purposes. It might be 5
degrees at 6:30 am, and my dog expects a walk, and holds me to
account for making that happen. In a friendship there is give and
take, and this can take place between humans, and between humans
and other critters. A refusal ever to be accountable and responsive
would rule out friendship in both cases. So a provisional answer to
the domination objection is that there can be sufficient mutuality, or
give and take, for friendship. (When humans interact with
independent or wild animals, it is quite clear, in some cases, that the
animals are not dominated. Sometimes birds interact quite
deliberately with humans, expressing preferences for some food over
others, demanding attention and seeming to adopt unwanted
behaviours if their demands are not satisfied. How close such
connections can come to friendships is not clear, but they offer an
example of animal-human connections that arise without household
domination.)
The second objection is exemplified by Milligan’s claim that
friendship is cognitively demanding in a way that animal companions
can’t achieve (Milligan 2009). Accounts of friendship that involves
sophisticated cognitive interpretation of the friend (Kennett and
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Cocking 1998) or a capacity to articulate principles will not be
amenable to including (other than human) animals. Although the
ascription of cognitive capacity to non-human animals varies, there
are limits to what animals can do, or be seen to do. However, setting
the cognitive bar very high will restrict the set of humans who can
properly be said to participate in friendship, which is a version of the
separation problem (the challenge of separating humans from other
animals on moral grounds, or in relation to morally significant
practices. See McMahan 2008). Younger children, among others, will
not be friends. Alternatively including animals (and less sophisticated
humans) as friends might inform an understanding of friendship, for
example involving mutuality, but not an equality requirement for
friendship (Goering 2003).
The final objection – that of moral agency – can be traced back
to Aristotle, and remains a live objection in contemporary
discussions. Jordan (2001) follows Aristotle’s classic analysis of
friendship in which we can be friends on the basis of pleasure,
benefits or virtue. Jordan sees animal-human friendships as
analogous to human-human friendships, and claims that it is
uncontroversial that humans can befriend certain animals, in most of
the ways that Aristotle describes.
Jordan argues that dogs can be friends with humans, and:
Since one can play with a dog, enjoy being with a dog,
communicate with a dog, share things with a dog, do
things with a dog, trust and be trusted by a dog and take
care of a dog, it certainly looks as though one can be a
companion-friend with a dog. Further, there appears no
obvious reason to deny that one could even establish a
utility-friendship, or a pleasure-friendship, with a dog.
While it is true that one cannot establish a virtuefriendship with a dog, it does not follow that one cannot
be a friend in any sense with a dog (Jordan 2001, 520).
According to Jordan, following Aristotle, in each case, we also
are concerned for our friends, not for our own sake, but for the
friend’s sake. Many who share a household with a non-human critter
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would think they act for the pet’s sake, and not all would always be
deluded or self-deceived. In contrast, Spencer et al present an
analogy between pets and other animals treated purely
instrumentally (Spencer et al 2006). Spencer et al claim, for example,
that a dog is forced to exercise at the owner’s whim. But in my house,
my dog wakes me up and demands a walk, and I comply. Admittedly,
I could perhaps arrange things so I would not be disturbed in the
early morning, but this pattern has emerged as part of our shared life.
This is different from a use of an animal purely for human concern,
for example, in laboratory testing. Some of each party’s actions need
to be plausibly called other-regarding, for example, as expressing
affection. By these standards, humans and animals can be friends.
There are no differences between dogs, cows, sheep, pigs and goats
(and likely other animals) relevant to the possibility of befriending
them, so humans can potentially befriend these animals too.
Of the range of friendships presented by Aristotle, Jordan
concludes that only the virtuous friendship is unavailable. Here,
again, it is the ascription (or non-ascription) of certain capacities to
the animal that excludes it from this kind of friendship. (As Irwin
points out, Aristotle excludes animals from choice, but not from
voluntary action. For animals and children, actions can be voluntary,
but not responsible. They can’t have the ultimate rational desire for
happiness – happiness as “the ultimate end that includes everything
we have reason to choose for itself” (Irwin 1980, 129) and that means
they can have only very limited decisions, not decisions about the
whole of life.) The Aristotelian view of animals is echoed in Steven
Sapontzis’s argument that “while many of their actions are virtuous,
animals are not moral beings because these actions are not part of a
moral life” where a moral life is one in which one is aiming (at an
individual or social level) towards some ideal (or morally better) way
of life (Sapontzis 1980, 50). In order to have such a “program of
fulfilling an ideal,” (Sapontzis 1980, 50) a capacity for reflection is
needed, but non-human animals don’t show this.
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Perhaps Jordan and Sapontzis are too quick to conclude that no
virtue friendship is possible between humans and others (see
Ferguson 2004). Clearly (in my view) we can have affection and
mutual benefit (Aristotle’s pleasure and utility friendships). The
capacity for reflective moral thinking, and character cultivation, in
the way Aristotle explains the aspiration to live a good life is probably
outside the repertoire of non-humans, but it is beyond many humans
too. That bar seems excessively high, and I think many of my
friendships don’t involve that kind of deep or moralised conversation,
even where it is possible in some sense that they might.
Animals seem capable of at least some degree of virtuous
behaviour. Animals can exhibit compassion, bravery, loyalty and the
like. One famous example is that of animals in experimental
conditions who refuse to press the food bar if doing so will deliver a
painful shock to a creature in the next cage, as well as the desirable
pellet of food (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). If virtuous behaviour is
possible, and a co-construction of some kind of shared life with goods
for both parties seems to be possible with companion animals, then
there is no reason to exclude animals from the whole domain of
virtue friendships. At best, there is reason merely to concede that
some friendships involve highly interpretative and articulate
interaction of a kind that animals don’t participate in. (The moral
value of this practice is variable: eg exhaustive “workshopping”
aspects of my life and my friend’s, including various others with
whom we interact could evoke more compassionate patient attitudes
or be self-indulgent, arrogant backbiting. It is worth remembering
that friendship can lead us morally astray (Cocking and Kennett
2000).)
Social support is one of the most often cited reasons for having a
pet (Staatsa, Wallace and Anderson 2008). I think we can learn about
resilience, joy, forgiveness and the like from animal companions, and
in some ways animals might be very well placed to be moral
exemplars. My cat is unimpressed by various superficial things like
gadgets, fashion, status. “Animals are non-judgmental
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friends” (Mathews 2007, 16). Animals can respond to us in ways that
differ from human responses, often on the basis of our kindness,
sensitivity and responsiveness. (At the same time, one might think
my cat is unashamedly out for what he can get, so I don’t mean to
romanticise his attitudes or character.) I surmise that benefits to
humans from animal-human relationships can include moral
benefits.

4. Animals can be Friends, but the Moral Implications
are Limited
These considerations show that there is a plausible case for
thinking (at least some) animals might be friends with humans, and
that some important objections to this characterisation can be met.
In some cases, it might be circumstances, luck or opportunity that
dictate who our friends or companions can be. I suspect also that
there are differences between persons– my capacity for friendship is
best exercised in relations with non-humans, another person’s is best
expressed with other humans. If so, why think friendships between
humans and non-humans are philosophically interesting, not just a
topic of brute disagreement or human and non-human variability?
For one thing, as the discussion shows, exploring the reasons why
animals can or cannot be friends can shed light on interspecies
relationships and on friendships and related concepts more generally.
However, acknowledging friendship with animals is less of an
advantage for animals than might be hoped. It might seem obvious
that friends are treated better than non-friends, so if animals are
considered friends, they will be better treated. But the obviousness is
misleading here. Preferential treatment for friends does not extend to
potential friends, but rather privileges one’s actual friends. It is
selective, and that is precisely why it can be a particularly
problematic form of partiality.
Some thinkers have sought to derive moral leverage from taking
animal-human friendships seriously: if people see animals as friends,
we can be motivated to treat them better (non-instrumentally), for

55

example, restricting or ruling out certain research or food purposes.
Jordan uses a friendship argument to argue for vegetarianism, and
concludes that it is wrong to eat such animals, just as it is (under
normal circumstances) wrong to eat one’s friends (Jordan 2001). He
shows that “if something is a possible friend…it is not a morally
permissible foodstuff” and concludes in favour of vegetarianism
(Jordan 2001, 311). The vegetarianism may be restricted – perhaps
there are some animals that can’t be friends, and if so, it may be
permissible that that one might eat them. Perhaps oysters or snails
would be candidates.
These kinds of “pure use” relationships with animals in which
animals are treated more or less like things manifest at best
indifference to the particular animal in question. Many animals used
for food, breeding or in laboratories are treated as interchangeable,
even disposable. The indifference to the well-being of the animals in
question can amount to cruelty. The moral leverage thought is that
seeing animals as friends might preclude this kind of attitude and the
treatment it licenses. One reason it seems promising is that some
species (including rats, dogs, rabbits) are found in family-household
relations as well as “use” or exploitation contexts.
Rosemary Rodd offers a second example. “Once one has seen a
particular animal as a friendly individual it no longer becomes easy
to regard another individual animal as a laboratory ‘tool’” (Rodd
1985, 54). Here, Rodd is pointing to a tension between having a
relationship based on a unique inherent value of an animal (pet,
friend, companion) and being able to treat a very similar animal
purely instrumentally. Becoming an animal experimenter often
requires the adoption of that latter view. Rodd argues that there may
be risks in overcoming a “sentimental” sympathy for animals in order
to overcome common scruples and inhibitions against using them in
at least some kinds of experimental ways (Rodd 1985; see also
McLean 2009).
While the inconsistency shown to companions on one hand and
beasts of burden, use, consumption, and pests on the other attracts
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significant criticism, there is a pragmatic objection to the moral
leverage argument: we don’t seem to have progressed very far
towards consistent conduct. As humans, we are good at
inconsistency, bad at consistency, so an appeal to consistency seems
unlikely to engender much change. In any case, a deeper problem is
that friendship seems to be about partial and preferential rather than
consistent treatment, so it isn’t the right conceptual mechanism to
motivate a general concern.
To see this, consider again Jeff Jordan’s initially persuasive
moral leverage argument (Jordan 2001). It is unacceptable (under
normal conditions, for which read there are no urgent survival needs)
to eat one’s friends. Many (if not all) commonly consumed animal
species are as capable of friendship with humans as are dogs. (Pigs,
cows, chickens and sheep can have affectionate, playful connections).
So we should not be eating those animals. Humans who are
omnivores and for whom consuming animal flesh is not an urgent
survival need should not eat meat. We are unlike wild predators who
must eat meat or perish (compare Everett 2001, and Shapiro 2006).
As indicated by Jordan’s title “Friends should not let friends be
eaten,” the implications go further than human vegetarianism.
Suppose some of our domestic animals are both friends and obligate
carnivores. Suppose my cat and dog don’t and can’t thrive on a vegan
diet in the way that I can. I am in charge of providing for their needs
– they eat what they are given, they are given what I purchase for
them. If the moral leverage argument worked, a paradoxical result
would arise: friendship requires you to do (use animals as food) what
friendship prohibits (use animals as food). And friendship licenses at
least some partiality and preference for one’s actual friends above
potential friends, so the conclusion about general treatment is
problematic, or the argument requires me to abandon friendship with
obligate carnivores such as cats. While I don’t accept the moral
leverage argument for vegetarianism, to the extent that there are
compelling reasons for vegetarianism, the paradox might be
avoidable, but not the problem. The moral cost of my friendships
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with animal companions is that I am implicated in the morally
unjustified practice of treating potential friends as food.
Rodd’s argument applies to actual encounters with animals and
in these cases, extending one’s friendly attitude to interactions could
support behavioural change (Rodd 1985). But reservations remain
because humans so easily compartmentalise our attitudes, and on the
whole we seem more likely to use our capacity for reason to
rationalise convenient conduct than to lift our moral game. While
animals can be our friends, that result does not do them as much
good as has been hoped.
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